Methodological Materialism and What If
The third morning of Kitzmiller vs. Dover found philosopher of science Robert Pennock testifying for the plaintiffs that science is a search for natural explanations of natural phenomena — a limitation known as methodological naturalism (or methodological materialism).
Pennock presented this as the definition of science, and said proponents of intelligent design are “trying to overturn” it, but later he conceded that there was a controversy among philosophers of science concerning whether methodological naturalism was essential to the definition of science.
Earlier in the trial, the ACLU led its first expert witness, biologist Kenneth Miller, through some counterfactual (or “what-if”) reasoning, an investigative tool often used by philosophers. I wish one of the attorneys had led Pennock through the following ”what if” scenario (in this case, a counterfactual that might be actual): What if something in the natural world was the product of design — say, the origin of the first life, or the fine tuning of the physical constants for life?
Now, a materialist might respond, “Well it wasn’t,” as if the mental exercise is some sort of sneaky, schoolyard trick: “Will you pretend for a minute that I’m cooler than you?” “All right, why?” “Ha! You admit it. I’m cooler than you.”
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