In my most recent posts in this series on the science of purpose, I have proposed a unified metaphysical framework for the life sciences that reconciles two conundrums in biology, specified irreducible complexity and emergence. Simply stated, once purpose is included in the ontology of science, these two puzzles dissipate into a complementarity that forms the basis for a proper understanding of life itself.
At the same time a most interesting development has occurred. The proponents of naturalism are now also incorporating purpose into their explanatory framework. This might be seen as in a favorable light, as a concession of sorts on their part. But it might also be seen as a way to co-opt the remarkable progress of the ID movement which has been leading the way on the science of purpose for decades. As an illustration, see the 2023 collection of essays Evolution “On Purpose”: Teleonomy in Living Systems, edited by Peter Corning (MIT Press).
Plato’s Revenge
It is also worth noting that a leading spiritually agnostic (at least, that is my impression) biology researcher, Michael Levin at Tufts University, is himself a proponent of teleology in nature. Levin has emphatically endorsed the concept that intelligence and consciousness are ingressed from an immaterial “Platonic space” and that there is no naturalistic explanation for this. See a conversation below between Dr. Levin and podcaster Lex Fridman.
Levin’s views bear striking resemblances to those those of ID scientists, including Günter Bechly and, especially, Richard Sternberg. The latter’s thinking is the subject of a recent book, Plato’s Revenge: The New Science of the Immaterial Genome, by David Klinghoffer.
Intelligent Design According to Edward Feser
Still another remarkable development centering on the science of purpose has now surfaced: the debate between what some Thomistic scholars refer to as a pure Aristotelian teleology and what they describe as an extrinsic/mechanistic teleology purportedly advocated by intelligent design proponents. In the words of prominent Thomist Edward Feser:
The Aristotelian-Thomistic conception of teleology is therefore very different from that reflected in “design arguments” of “Intelligent Design” theory … which tend to reduce all teleology to extrinsic teleology…
Aristotle’s Revenge, Edward Feser (2019), p. 37
Feser’s argument is that, properly understood, teleology is immanently embedded in the nature of substances, which are composites of form and matter. As such, all substances are naturally directed toward their end, or telos, without need for any externally imposed immaterial agency.
Feser himself acknowledges that “that kind of teleology” by itself does not ultimately require a divine cause, “but requires further metaphysical premises.” (pp. 37-38)
Meanwhile, advocates of naturalism have also used this description of teleology to propose a materialist explanation that undermines Feser’s Thomism. Not surprisingly, several of the major advocates of dispositionalism claim that if nature is simply proceeding towards the functions of its own intrinsic properties, purposeful or otherwise, without any extrinsic involvement by an immaterial agency, then naturalism by itself is inclusive of all of those concepts, without the need for a divine cause.
Perhaps the most prominent Thomist of the 20th century, Étienne Gilson, in his landmark book, From Aristotle to Darwin and Back Again, forcefully made the case for final causality, but refused to conclude on that basis that final causality by itself was proof of the existence of divine intervention.
To be sure, even in my own most recent post (“How Life Becomes Comprehensible: A New Scientific Framework”), where I advocated that the proper empirical understanding of living systems requires the acknowledgment of purpose and necessity, that acknowledgement alone does not exclude claims of naturalists who want to appropriate purpose within their materialist framework, as pointed out above.
Back to Metaphysics
This brings us back to metaphysics, which by definition attempts proof via logic alone without empiricism. That is, except if we employ a logical framework, such as that of purpose and necessity, to explain physical reality. And that framework includes agencies that are not empirically demonstrable, such as telos or purpose. In that case, I maintain that we have in fact bridged the gap between metaphysics and science!
That is to say, if we want to resolve other conundrums such as the origin of life, consciousness, or the “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences,” and if we can find no answer in so-called “natural causes” despite a century of exhaustive searching, there is only one place left where we can turn.
And that place can only be immaterial agency. Once we see this, we then exclude all attempts by naturalism to appropriate purpose and Thomistic teleology (aka teleonomy).
Notice that my use of the term “immaterial agency” does not specify anything other than the exclusion of a naturalist, materialist ontology. Readers of these pages will of course be familiar already with examples of immaterial agency as they have been articulated by scientists and scholars in the intelligent design community.